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I.   Introduction 
The Maryland v. Buie court established the principle of a protective sweep, which is a 
sweep of a home incident to an arrest where “they have reasonable suspicion to believe the home 
may harbor a dangerous third party.”1 Buie was decided solely in the arrest context, and there is 
now a split among the circuit courts regarding the application of the protective sweep doctrine to 
non-arrest contexts.2 The majority of circuit courts have concluded that Buie does extend to non-
arrest contexts, specifically consent entries.3 The doctrine is abused in certain instances which 
leads home owners to fear for the protection of their privacy interests.  
 This comment focuses on whether or not Buie can effectively be extended to situations 
where officers have been given consent to enter the home, but not consent to search. Further, 
does the Buie doctrine, as it stands, properly balance the private and governmental interests that 
the Fourth Amendment seeks to protect?  The circuit courts are divided between the view that 
Buie applies when an objectively reasonable officer would have reason to be concerned for 
safety and there are articulable facts in non-arrest contexts, and that Buie does not apply at all to 
consent entries. I believe that the application of Buie to non-arrest, consent entry contexts can be 
effective as long as the consent given for entry and the articulable facts given by the officer are 
analyzed and justifiable to conduct a warrantless search.  
I argue that Buie can effectively address non-arrest, consent to entry contexts. The Fourth 
Amendment only bars unreasonable searches and seizures.4 I suggest that for the Buie doctrine 
to apply to non-arrest, consent entry contexts without being potentially unreasonable, the courts 
                                                          
1 See Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325 (1990).  
2 Leslie A. O’Brien, Finding a Reasonable Approach to the Extension of the Protective Sweep Doctrine in Non-
Arrest Situations, 82 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1139, 1141 (2007).  
3 Id.  
4 Buie, 494 U.S. at 331 (quoting U.S. Const. Amend. IV).  
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must look to the scope of consent of the home owner as well as the actual articulable facts that 
the officer gives to the court for justifying the warrantless search. It is important for homeowners 
to know that the consent given for an officer’s entry is a limiting power that they possess. The 
consent to entry is consent to one room, not the consent to a search of an entire home. This 
consent analysis grants protection to the interests of the private home owner against the Buie 
doctrine’s low burden of proof. In addition to emphasizing the consent to entry, the court must 
analyze the articulable facts. This would ensure that officers are not merely listing off a set of 
facts, but rather compiling facts that could justify a warrantless search in this context.   
An example of the approach I emphasize is the recent decision by the United States 
District Court of the Southern District of New York in United States v. Fadul. The case involved 
officers entering an apartment based on consent to entry, but did not have a warrant to search.5 
The officers believed, based on the occupants and their actions, that they needed to conduct a 
protective sweep to ensure their safety in the apartment.6 The court was faced with whether or 
not the officers were allowed to conduct a protective-sweep in this context.7  The basic principle 
is that the Fourth Amendment protects “the right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures.”8 However, there are 
justifications for warrantless searches that the courts have accepted in the warrantless search 
context.9 Of relevant concern is a search of the private home where an individual gives consent 
for entry, but the officers now wish to conduct a protective sweep. The Fadul court, after 
analyzing the consent and the facts found that the officers did not have articulable facts to 
                                                          
5 United States v. Fadul, 16 F. Supp. 3d 270, 271(S.D.N.Y. 2014). 
6 Fadul, 16 F. Supp. 3d at 275.  
7 See Fadul, 16 F. Supp. 3d. 270. 
8 U.S. Const. amend. IV.  
9 Fadul, 16 F. Supp. 3d 270, 279 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (citing In re Terrorist Bombings of United States Embassies in E. 
Afr., 552 F.3d 157, 168).   
4 
 
conduct the protective sweep.10 The Southern District of New York’s analysis is the proper 
approach and should be utilized by the courts in Buie searches.  
 In Part II, I will provide the origin of the protective sweep doctrine and the definition of 
consent.  I will outline Maryland v. Buie’s creation of the doctrine and its application. In Part III, 
I will provide an overview of the current United States Circuit Courts of Appeals split on the 
protective sweep doctrine involving non-arrest cases. In Part IV, I will explain the Jimeno v. 
Florida Supreme Court Decision, and how the consent definition from that case should be 
applied in Buie analysis. In Part V, I will explain the police created exigency exception to the 
Fourth Amendment that arose from Kentucky v. King and what it means in light of protective 
sweep applications.  
II. What is a Protective Sweep? 
A. Maryland v. Buie and the Protective Sweep Doctrine  
 The Supreme Court embraced the “protective sweep” as a legitimate search in Maryland 
v. Buie. The case involved the execution of an arrest warrant for Jerome Buie, at Buie’s home.11 
Buie was found in the basement.12 After his arrest, an officer looked in the basement for other 
individuals and found evidence tying Buie to the alleged crime.13 The issue before the Supreme 
Court was the legality of the post-arrest search of the basement. The Buie court turned to Terry v. 
Ohio and Michigan v. Long which rejected a probable cause standard “when there is a need for 
law enforcement officers to protect themselves against violence in situations where they may 
                                                          
10 Id. at 291-92.  
11 Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 328 (1990).  
12 Id. 
13 Id.   
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lack probable cause for an arrest.14 Buie found that this similar interest in protecting officers was 
to “assure themselves that the house in which a suspect is in, or has just been, is not harboring 
other persons who are dangerous and who could expectedly launch an attack.”15 
 Buie’s facts emphasized officer safety in light of the risk of ambush and officer well-
being.16  “The risk of danger in the context of an arrest in the home is as great, if not greater than, 
as an on-the-street or roadside investigatory encounter.”17  A protective sweep is done to make 
sure the officer is safe and to ensure a level playing field, since the officer is on the adversary’s 
turf.18  The Court held that 
as an incident to the arrest the officers could, as a precautionary matter and without 
probable cause or reasonable suspicion, look in closets and other spaces 
immediately adjoining the place of [an] arrest from which an attack could be 
immediately launched. Beyond that, however, we hold that there must be 
articulable facts which, taken together with the rational inferences from those facts, 
would warrant a reasonably prudent officer in believing that the area to be swept 
harbors an individual posing a danger to those on the arrest scene.19 
The Court emphasized that a protective sweep is not a search of the full premises, but only to a 
“cursory inspection of where a person may be found.”20  The sweep lasts no longer than is 
necessary to dispel the reasonable suspicion of danger and in any event no longer than it takes to 
complete the arrest and depart the premises.”21   
Buie’s standard includes both an objective and subjective requirement.22 Thus, the 
government needs to prove that (1) there is a reasonable belief a third party is present but also 
                                                          
14 Buie, 494 U.S. at 332  
15 Id. at 333.  
16 Id. 
17 Id. 
18 Id. 
19 Id. at 334.  
20 Buie, 494 U.S. at 327.  
21 Id. at 335.  
22 Buie, 494 U.S. at 333.  
6 
 
that (2) the searching officer actually possessed that belief.23 Further, the Buie test needs proof 
that there is a reasonable suspicion that another person “(1) is present and (2) poses a danger.”24 
However, a circuit split has developed as to whether or not the Buie test extends to non-arrest 
contexts, specifically consent entries. 
III. The Current Circuit Split 
A. Buie Approach Not Extended to Consent Entries 
The Maryland v. Buie decision has led to a split among the circuit courts as to whether or 
not the protective sweep doctrine can apply to the non-arrest, consent entry context. The first 
position to emerge from the Buie decision was that the protective sweep doctrine does not apply 
to non-arrest contexts. In United States v. Waldner, the Eighth Circuit declined to extend the 
Buie approach for consent entries in the non-arrest context. The court analyzed a search 
conducted pursuant to the enforcement of a protection order.25  Officers went to Waldner’s home 
to execute the order, and Waldner answered the door.26  The officers explained that if Waldner 
needed anything from the house, they would have to accompany him.27  Waldner agreed, which 
led an officer to ask Waldner if anyone else was in the home or if there were any weapons, to 
which Waldner replied no.28 The officers and Waldner went to the basement, where Waldner 
wanted to obtain clothes.29  One officer followed Waldner and searched the room, finding neither 
guns nor any other contraband.30  However, Waldner walked towards a room in the basement, 
                                                          
23 Maren J. Messing, The Protective Sweep Doctrine: Reaffirming a Limited Exception, 44 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. 
PROBS. 33, 44 (2010). 
24 Id. 
25 United States v. Waldner, 425 F.3d 514, 515 (8th Cir. 2005). 
26 Id. at 515-516. 
27 Id. at 516. 
28 Id. 
29 Id. 
30 Id. 
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and the officers wanted to conduct a protective sweep of that room because Waldner was 
standing near it.31  The officers found a gun cabinet that contained a rifle with a silencer on it.32   
 The court explained that Buie established a two prong test for a protective sweep.33  The 
test allows for a protective sweep if: (1) incident to an arrest, officers may “search closets and 
other spaces immediately adjoining the place of arrest from which an attack could be 
immediately launched”, and (2) the court “permitted a broader sweep when an officer possesses 
a reasonable belief based on specific and articulable facts that the area to be swept harbors an 
individual posing a danger to those on the arrest scene.”34 Further, Buie did not articulate 
whether a protective sweep could permissibly be conducted for a search of weapons or 
contraband.35  In this case, the officers conducted the search incident to serving a protective 
order, a non-arrest situation.36  The Eighth Circuit explicitly stated that they would not extend 
Buie to non-arrest situations.37  In the alternative, the court found that the officers lacked the 
satisfying articulable facts required to justify a reasonable officer to have conducted a protective 
sweep, thus missing the objective factor of Buie.38  
 Similarly to Waldner, the Tenth Circuit declined to extend the Buie doctrine to consent 
entries.  In United States v. Torres-Castro, Victor Torres-Castro was suspected of abusing his 
fourteen-year-old girlfriend.39  The officers arrived at the home and saw the house was full of 
                                                          
31 Waldner, 425 F.3d at 516. 
32 Id.  
33 Id. at 517.  
34 Id. at 517 (citing Buie, 494 U.S. at 334).  
35 Id. 
36 Id. 
37 Waldner, 425 F.3d at 517. 
38 Id. (explaining that Waldner would have had to pass the officer to get to the office to obtain the fire arm, which he 
did not do).   
39 United States v. Torres, 470 F.3d 992, 995 (10th Cir. 2006). 
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individuals, including Torres-Castro.40 When the officers were allowed to enter the home by 
Torres-Castro, the officers felt compelled to conduct a protective sweep because the occupants 
were spread throughout the home.41 The court found that expanding “the doctrine will encourage 
law officers to gain legal entry through knock and talk requests and then gather evidence without 
any requirement of suspicion or compliance with the Fourth Amendment.”42 The Tenth Circuit 
concluded that the protective sweep will not be extended to include non-arrest situations, such as 
non-arrest consent entries.43 
B.      Buie Applies to Non-Arrest, Consent Entries 
The opposite side of the current circuit split is that the protective sweep doctrine should 
be applied in consent entry scenarios. The first circuit court to rule that Buie applied to the 
consent entry context was the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
Circuit in 1992.  In United States v. Patrick, Gary Patrick moved into Kevin Smith’s apartment 
while Smith was hospitalized.44  Smith met with the police, since the officers wanted to 
investigate the apartment, and signed a form authorizing the officers to search his apartment 
within ten days, but the officers did not search the apartment until sixteen days later.45 Smith let 
the officers in when they arrived.46 The officers saw four people in the living room, and noticed a 
bedroom door open.47  The officers went back to that bedroom and found Patrick half on, half off 
                                                          
40 Id. 
41 Id. at 999.  
42 Id.  
43 Torres, 470 F.3d at 999.  
44 United States v. Patrick, 959 F.2d 991, 994 (D.C. Cir. 1992). 
45 Id.  
46 Id.  
47 Id.  
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the bed with his hand underneath the bed.48  The police saw in plain view money, a beeper, and a 
clear plastic bag holding cocaine.49  The officers arrested Patrick upon finding the contraband.50  
The D.C. Circuit Court began its analysis of the search by evaluating the protective 
sweep conducted of Smith’s apartment. Patrick argued that he had an expected privacy within 
the bedroom since Smith did not have the authority to give the officers consent to search his 
room.51 The officers were lawfully on the premises, and convinced the court that the protective 
sweep was proper because their reasonable belief was that the occupants were trafficking 
narcotics and that their safety was at risk.52 The officers’ explanation of the articulable facts met 
the objective and subjective requirements of Buie.53  Under the circumstances and absent the 
warrant, the D.C. Circuit Court concluded that Buie extended to this type of search, absent a 
warrant and the officers only had consent to enter the apartment.54  Therefore, the D.C. Circuit 
allowed Buie to be applied in the non-arrest context.55 
In 2004, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit heard United States v. 
Gould.56  On October 17, 2000, officers received a call warning that Kelly Gould had a plan to 
kill two judges.57  The officers did not intend to arrest Gould when they visited his trailer, but to 
talk to him.58  Another resident in the trailer consented to the officers’ entry into the trailer and 
told the officers that Gould was in the back room.59  The bedroom door was open, and Gould was 
                                                          
48 Id.  
49 Patrick, 959 F.2d at 994.  
50 Id.  
51 Id. at 996.  
52 Patrick, 959 F.2d at 996. 
53 Id.  
54 Id.  
55 Patrick, 959 F.2d at 998.  
56 United States v. Gould, 364 F.3d 578 (5th Cir. 2004). 
57 Id. at 580. 
58 Id.  
59 Id. 
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not readily visible.60 The officers then performed a sweep of the room to see if Gould was 
hiding, where they found rifles in a closet.61  The officers later arrested Gould after asking him 
who owned the rifles.62 
The court endeavored to decide whether or not the protective sweep was appropriate in 
this case.  Buie emphasized the fact of the arrest but there is no limit that other circumstances 
may not expose an officer  
“to a comparable degree of danger . . . [that would] justify a similar protective 
response (at least where those circumstances are not the product of police 
illegality or misconduct) . . . [b]ut nothing in Buie suggests that the result would 
have been different had the police otherwise properly entered the house as, for 
example, pursuant to a proper consent rather than a warrant.”63   
The “physical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth 
Amendment is directed and the Fourth Amendment has drawn a firm line at the entrance to the 
house.”64  
However, Buie makes “clear that the [protective sweep] does not preclude application in 
the in-home sweep context of the general reasonableness standard calculated by balancing the 
intrusion of Fourth Amendment interests against the promotion of legitimate governmental 
interests, includes those of officer safety.”65  Specifically, Gould found that an arrest does give 
evidence of a danger to the officer, but the danger to officers may be established by other 
circumstances.66  Therefore, the protective sweep doctrine should be applied in non-arrest 
contexts determined by the particular facts of the case.  
                                                          
60 Id. 
61 Id. 
62 Gould, 364 F.3d at 580. . 
63 Id. at 581.  
64 Gould, 364 F.3d at 588. 
65 Id. at 583-83.  
66 Id. 
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The court further noted that the officers in this case were given consent to enter the trailer 
when the occupant told the officers they were welcome to check out the bedroom.67  The court 
found that the consent given was meant to include searching the bedroom to see if Gould was 
there, and when they looked around the room for Gould, they then found the guns in the closet.68  
This was a lawful entry for the trailer, further granting a search of the trailer to find Gould, but 
not to search the bedroom. Thus, the consent here was acceptable for the entry and the articulable 
facts were found to be satisfying, which permitted the officers to conduct the protective sweep.  
Most recently, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit adopted the 
extension of Buie to consent entry cases in 2013.69  This case involved a robber attempting to 
hold up a restaurant, and the robber was tracked by officers to an apartment after the attempted 
robbery.70  The officers went to the apartment without an arrest or search warrant after viewing 
the surveillance tape of the attempted robbery.71 The officers stated that they would return with a 
warrant if the occupants did not open the door, which caused Holland to open the door.72  
Holland was not the suspect, but was asked by the officers whether or not there was anyone else 
in the apartment.73  Holland replied no, but then the officers heard rustling in a nearby room, 
where they found the suspect attempting to hide while conducting a protective sweep.74  Holland 
was arrested, and after the initial protective sweep, he signed a form consenting to an additional 
search of the apartment.75 
                                                          
67 Id. at 588.  
68 Gould, 364 F.3d at 588.  
69 United States v. Holland, 552 F. App’x 265 (6th Cir. 2013).  
70 Holland, 552 F. App’x at 269.  
71 Id.  
72 Id. 
73 Id. 
74 Holland, 552 F. App’x at 269.  
75 Id.  
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At trial, Holland argued that he had only given consent for the officers to enter the 
apartment and that consent did not encompass a search of the bedroom.76 The court concluded 
the consent given by Holland was valid in this case.77  The merits of Holland’s claim required 
that the consent be voluntary; the government bears the burden of proving that consent was given 
voluntarily.78  “Consent is voluntary if it is unequivocal, specific[,] and intelligently given, 
uncontaminated by any duress or coercion.”79 The test is an objective one, and the court must 
address “whether the totality of the circumstances establishes that the defendant permitted the 
police inside.”80  The court must also consider the defendant’s “subjective understanding of his 
constitutional right . . . the defendant’s personal characteristics, the length and nature of the 
police – citizen interaction, and the use of police coercion, subtle or otherwise.”81  
The court found the consent was valid in this context, and transitioned to the protective 
sweep itself.  “[W]e joined the majority of circuits in holding that the Buie protective sweep 
doctrine extends to situations other than execution of arrest warrants.”82  Applying Taylor, the 
court found that the officers were lawfully present through the consent of Holland, and that once 
they heard noises from the bedroom the officers wanted to ensure their safety by checking the 
bedroom.83 The entry to the bedroom was lawful based on these facts since it could lead an 
objectively reasonable officer to believe there was the potential harm of ambush.84 Holland only 
intended the consent to be limited to entering the apartment, but the court was convinced by the 
                                                          
76 Holland, 552 F. App’x at 269.  
77 Holland, 552 F. App’x at 271. 
78 Id. at 273-74.  
79 Id. at 274.  
80 Id. (See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227(1973)).  
81 Id. (citing United States v. Lucas, 640 F.3d 168, 174 (6th Cir. 2011)).  
82 Holland, 552 F. App’x at 275. 
83 Id. at 276.  
84 Id. (See United States v. Taylor, 248 F.3d 506 (6th Cir. 2001)) (explaining that the protective sweep can be done in 
non-arrest situations when looking at the totality of the circumstances, the officers also had probable cause to search 
the apartment for the fear of someone hiding). 
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articulable facts that the protective sweep performed by the officers to ensure their safety 
satisfied the Buie doctrine and met the requirements of reasonable suspicion.85  
IV. Consent as a Limit to Help the Buie Doctrine 
The circuit split above illustrates how law enforcement utilizes the protective sweep doctrine.  
Officers utilize these searches often because police officers can list a few facts to satisfy the 
reasonable suspicion for fear for their safety requirement under Buie.86 However, the potential 
for abuse is present in protective sweeps, and to reduce the confusion for protective sweep 
doctrines as exhibited in the current circuit split, the definition of consent should be emphasized 
under Buie like the Florida v. Jimeno decision. Courts should give the consent of a private home 
owner added emphasis because it serves as a line of defense to the officer’s ability to potentially 
conduct a warrantless search in the individual’s home.  
A. Florida v. Jimeno and the Emphasis of Consent  
A. Florida v. Jimeno and the Definition of Consent in Search Contexts 
The Supreme Court was faced with the issue of whether or not a search of a paper bag in 
a car was permissible, when only consent to search the car was granted to a police officer.87 The 
police officer believed Enio Jimeno, a suspected drug dealer, might be involved in drug 
trafficking from a conversation he overheard.88  The officer, after pulling Jimeno over in a traffic 
stop, asked Jimeno whether or not he could search the car under the belief that Jimeno was 
carrying narcotics.89 Jimeno gave permission to Trujillo to search the vehicle.90 
                                                          
85 See generally Holland, 552 F. App’x 265.  
86 See generally Torres, 470 F.3d 992 (10th Cir. 2006) 
87 Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248 (1991).  
88 Id.  
89 Id.  
90 Id. at 249-50.  
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The officer eventually found a brown paper bag folded up in the car, which the officer 
opened the bag and found a kilogram of cocaine.91  Jimeno believed that when he gave consent 
to the officer only to search the vehicle, the consent given did not include opening the bag in the 
car, even when the search is for narcotics.92  The Supreme Court found consent to search creates 
a presumption that the officer’s search was reasonable in the first place.93  However, the 
“standard for measuring the scope of a suspect’s consent under the Fourth Amendment is that of 
objective reasonableness – what would the typical reasonable person have understood by the 
exchange between the officer and the suspect?”94 
The scope of the search is limited to its expressed object.95  This case was simple for the 
Court, Jimeno gave the officer permission to search the car.96 The officer searched the car 
because he believed that Jimeno was in possession of narcotics.97  The Court found that the 
consent given to the officer to search the car was objectively reasonable, such that the search for 
containers in the car which may bear narcotics was consented to as well.98   
The Court explained that a suspect may limit the consent for a search given to an officer, 
but if consent “would be reasonably understood to extend to a particular container, the Fourth 
Amendment provides no grounds for requiring a more explicit authorization.”99  The Schneckloth 
Court stated that “the community has a real interest in encouraging consent, for the resulting 
                                                          
91 Jimeno, 500 U.S. at 250. 
92 Id.  
93 Id. 250-51 (citing Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973)) (explaining that an individual has a right 
to withhold consent from an officer, and further giving consent was done voluntarily).  
94 Id. at 251 (citing Illinois v. Rodriguez 497 U.S. 177, 183-89 (1983)).  
95 Id. (citing United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982)).  
96 See Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248.  
97 Jimeno, 500 U.S. at 251.  
98 Id. (explaining a reasonable person may be expected to know that narcotics are generally carried in some form of 
a container. Further, the Court distinguished State v. Wells, where the driver’s consent to the officer did not extend 
to prying open a locked briefcase found in the trunk when consent was only given to search the trunk, not in the 
locked containers).  
99 Id.  
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search may yield necessary evidence for the solution and prosecution of [a] crime, evidence that 
may insure that a wholly innocent person is not wrongly charged with a criminal offense.”100 
Therefore, consent is limited to the objective reasonableness of what a typical reasonable person 
would have understood by the exchange with the officer. On the other hand, an individual may 
explicitly, or by what is reasonably implied by what the individual said, limit the consent given 
to an officer.  
B. Consent to Entry is Not Consent to Search  
 As the cases mentioned in the circuit split, there are situations where an officer conducts a 
protective sweep after a consensual entry. The protective sweep doctrine is supposed to strike a 
balance between an individual’s privacy right to their home and the government’s interests in 
conducting searches and maintaining officer safety.101 When these courts expanded Buie to 
included non-arrest consent entries, a danger emerged for the individual privacy rights to be 
sacrificed for the sake of an officer’s reiteration of facts he believes created a danger to his well-
being.  This occurs frequently when the officer arrives at the scene with knowledge that the 
suspect is potentially dangerous.102  However, the officers’ fear does not create consent to entry 
or a consent to search. The home owner creates the consent for an officer’s entry, and that should 
serve as a limit on the protective sweep doctrine unless additional consent is given. 
Buie requires that the officer have reasonable suspicion in order to conduct a protective 
sweep.103 Reasonable suspicion is less than a preponderance of the evidence.104 It’s less than the 
                                                          
100 Id. at 252. 
101 See Buie, 494 U.S. 325 (1990). 
102 See generally Leslie A. Obrien, Note: Finding a Reasonable Approach to the Extension of the Protective Sweep 
Doctrine In Non-Arrest Situations, 82 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1139.  
103 Buie, 494 U.S. at 336-37.  
104 United States v. Williams, 876 F.2d 1521 (11th Cir. 1989). 
16 
 
requirement of probable cause that there is a fair probability that evidence of a crime will be 
found.105  However, reasonable suspicion is more than just a hunch.106 The “Fourth Amendment 
accordingly requires that police articulate some minimal, objective justification for an 
investigatory stop.”107 Reasonable suspicion is a low standard which possibly allows an open 
invitation for officers to gather whatever facts they can to justify the warrantless search.  
The courts, in some instances, seem to have only required that officers reiterate a list of 
facts to justify a search instead of analyzing the facts as to whether or not they justify a 
protective sweep. For example, in United States v. Reid, the Ninth Circuit explained that “the 
existence of consent to a search is not lightly to be inferred and the government bears the burden 
of proof to establish the existence of effective consent.”108  Consent, like the definition in Jimeno 
which applied to a consent to search, should be applicable in the consent entry context for a 
protective sweep. This is because it fairly balances the interests of the government and the 
homeowner.  
William Ringel articulated that the  
The sole authority to a search after a person has given consent derives from the 
consent itself, the scope of the search must be limited strictly to the terms of the 
consent.  It is a suspect’s responsibility to limit the scope of a consensual search if 
he or she so intends… Where an individual gives a general consent to a search, and 
subsequently volunteers the information that evidence may be found within a 
specific part of the search area, he or she indicates that a search of that area is within 
the scope of the original consent.109 
Ringel’s analysis of consent to searches reiterates the importance of an individual’s consent and 
how a court should analyze a home owner’s consent. If an officer asks if they may come in, it 
                                                          
105 Buie, 494 U.S. at 329. 
106 Id.  
107 United States v. Tapia, 912 F.2d 1367, 1370 (11th Cir. 1990).  
108 United States v. Reid, 226 F.3d 1020, 1025 (9th Cir. 2000).   
109 William E. Ringel, Searches and Seizures Arrests and Confessions §9:13 (2d ed. 2014).  
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should be limited to the area where the individual rationally believed they limited the officer of 
being in the home, except for the closets and areas where someone may be hiding as per the Buie 
doctrine. Consent is then an implicit limit and not just a formality to obtain.  
For example, an officer knocks on the door and asks the occupant if they may come in to 
talk. If the individual says, “yes, come in,” that individual has created the scope of the entry with 
their consent. The home owner creates the parameters for the officer’s entry to the initial room 
he enters. The home owner has not said yes to a search, but only to the officer’s presence in the 
home. That does not leave the officer without any tool to search since an officer may search the 
room they’re permitted into as well as the closets adjoined to the room without having to ask for 
permission or consent. However, if an officer believes he has a reasonable suspicion of danger, 
because he was there to ask about an illegal gun charge, the officer may only justify a protective 
sweep if there are articulable facts that would convince a court an actual belief of danger existed.  
Buie and consent to search are two different justifications to conduct a warrantless search 
for an officer. The consent to entry is not a form of warrantless search, and should not invite the 
officer to feel they may search a home at first, especially under the Buie doctrine. In Gould, the 
officers arrived at the trailer and asked for Gould because of a tip that Gould planned to harm 
judges, in which an occupant said he’s in his room asleep, and let the officers in.110 The scope of 
consent, which is what they rationally believed they were consenting to was to let the officers in 
and go to the bedroom to find Gould. The officers went to the bedroom and did a protective 
sweep where they checked places where someone could be hiding.111 The officers were enabled 
to search the bedroom in case of danger under the Buie doctrine. However, the consent given to 
                                                          
110 United States v. Gould, 364 F.3d 578 (5th Cir. 2004). 
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the officers was to go to the bedroom to find Gould. The officers did not go anywhere else 
except where the occupant gave them permission. This is a simple example of how consent 
operates within a Buie protective sweep.  
However, a more complicated example would be United States v. Hassock. In this case, 
the officers were allowed into the apartment by one of the occupants.112 The officers asked if 
they may search around, and the occupant said yes.113 The occupant did not tell the officers they 
may search every room in the house, but only to look around the room.114 The officers were not 
given consent to enter the front bedroom, but argued that they were conducting a protective 
sweep due to fear of danger of any possibility for an attack.115 The court concluded that the 
protective sweep was not justified by the officers since they did not have articulable facts to 
justify their suspicion of fear.116  
The court should have utilized the Jimeno definition of consent, which would have 
enabled the court to be able to ignore the sweep itself since the officers were only allowed to 
enter the apartment, not enter the bedrooms of those that weren’t specifically given permission to 
enter. It is not plausible to derive whether or not a homeowner consented to a search, only that 
they allowed the officers into their home. The consent to entry allows Buie to operate (since 
officers may search the adjoining areas to a room they’re let into) but limits an officer from 
conducting an all-out search. A consent to entry is not a consent to search. The distinction above 
would balance the interests of the government’s interests in searching and the right to privacy in 
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one’s home. An individual allowing an officer to come into the home should not be an open door 
for an officer to search the entire house.  
The definition of consent given for consent entries serves as a stronger alternative than 
what has been already suggested. Maren J. Messing suggested that protective sweeps should 
exclude consent entries.117 Messing’s concern is that police obtain free reign once consent is 
given for entry.118 Messing believed that law enforcement’s articulable facts to justify the sweep 
must be scrutinized and analyzed by the court.119  Her solution creates an issue of limiting 
protective sweeps to only certain situations. This method would eliminate protective sweeps in 
non-arrest contexts which is too drastic of a solution and harms the government’s interests.   
Similarly, Leslie O’Brien suggests that consent entries should not fall under the purview 
of the protective sweep doctrine.120 O’Brien seems to be concerned that a consent entry in non-
arrest situations will only be a fact gathering opportunity for the officer.121 The solution is 
consent entries be excluded and the officer is required to have knowledge that the home owner is 
suspected to have committed an inherently dangerous crime.122 This would lead consent entries 
to be obsolete in this context. Both authors have found that the consent to entry context is too 
easily abused by officers to conduct warrantless searches.  
The consent analysis with actual analysis of articulable facts approach would limit 
officers to a reasonable degree without eliminating the tool for officers in the consent context 
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like Messing and O’Brien have suggested. Officers should not lose the Buie doctrine because 
they entered a home pursuant to a consent to entry and without a search warrant. Officers, under 
Buie, may check the adjoined closets for their safety, but beyond that they are limited to that 
room. The consent given limits officers since they may not expand their search of the consented 
entry unless they can provide articulable facts as to fear of an ambush from another occupant, 
satisfying both the objective and subjective requirements of Buie. However, as O’Brien has 
suggested as well, the courts should additionally challenge the officer’s articulable facts to 
ensure that it justifies the warrantless search conducted.123 
When a reasonable person has given consent to an officer for entry, all the officer may do 
is enter the home. The reasonable consent, described in Jimeno, is only for the officer to enter the 
doorway to the home, not a search. It would be prima facie unreasonable for an officer to begin a 
warrantless search of the home unless they can state facts that justify it. As said by the Supreme 
Court, the cornerstone of the Buie doctrine is reasonableness.124 When opening the door, an 
individual may allow an officer to either enter the home or not. They have a choice in giving 
consent. However, once law enforcement in the home, as Buie suggests, facts may arise that will 
allow officers to conduct a protective sweep.125 Regardless of whether or not there is skepticism 
about an officer’s intent of entering the home, there still needs to be the balance between 
government and privacy rights. O’Brien and Messing found that consent entries are an open 
ground for officers to abuse the protective sweep doctrine. However, their solutions almost 
eliminate the protection granted by the protective sweep doctrine to officers. If the officer 
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receives a limited consent to entry, and have already checked the adjoined areas of the room, 
then the Buie doctrine is satisfied and the home owner’s private interests. 
In United States v. Fadul, Messing’s and O’Brien’s fear of officers abusing the protective 
sweep doctrine in non-arrest, consent entry contexts are emphasized between the officers 
arriving to investigate marijuana usage, and then possible facts leading to why the officers went 
to the back bedroom and conducted a protective sweep. In Fadul, officers received a civilian 
complaint about marijuana usage in an apartment.126 What occurred in the apartment, after the 
complaint was received by the officers, was heavily disputed by the New York City Police 
Department.127 According to the officers, they were given consent to enter the apartment by an 
occupant.128  
Once the officers were in the apartment, a child left the living room and went down the 
hallway.129  Detective Smyth, one of the officers, told the child to halt but the child continued 
down the hall.130 With these facts, the officers decided to conduct a protective sweep of the 
apartment.131  The officers searched the bathroom and then the three bedrooms of the 
apartment.132  After conducting a protective sweep, the officers found a gun and drug 
paraphernalia.133 
The court stated that “even considered together, the smell of marijuana, the number of 
civilians present, and presence of another person (whether taking a shower or otherwise) does 
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not even come close to justifying a protective sweep.”134 The Fadul court aggressively analyzed 
the officers shared belief of fear or danger. The court found that the officer’s fears had no 
specific facts to support the officers’ belief that the individuals posted a danger to their safety 
according to the Buie test.135 Further, the consent to entry given to the officers should concern 
courts since it encourages obtaining “consent as a pretext for conducting a warrantless search and 
undermine the well-established principle that a person can limit the scope of his or her consent to 
search to a particular area.”136 
Fadul shows the power of consent as well as the issues surrounding protective sweeps in 
consent entries. The conclusion reached by the Fadul court is exactly the analysis that courts 
should apply when determining whether a proper protective sweep was properly executed. The 
Court aggressively went through the facts given by the officer that the officers argued justified 
the warrantless search. Further, the apartment occupant’s consent was analyzed by the based on 
the facts given at trial. Thus, Fadul is a prime example of a proper protective sweep analysis in a 
conducted appropriately in a non-arrest, consent entry context. 
If an individual consents to an officer to enter the home, the person reasonably expects 
the officers to simply enter the home, nothing more. However, the officers can expand from that 
area to other areas of the home if there are articulable facts that would lead a court to actually 
believe that an officer had a reasonable suspicion of danger. If the court analyzes the consent and 
the facts similarly to how the Fadul court did, Messing’s and O’Brien’s concerns are eliminated. 
It is important for individual home owners to understand that their consent to the officer’s entry 
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is a limiting factor for officers. When a homeowner opens the door and tells the officer they may 
come in, it’s reasonable to believe they only meant one room and not a search of the entire home.  
V. An Alternative for Officers, the Police-Created Exigency Doctrine  
A. Kentucky v. King  
 The Supreme Court has acknowledged that there should be other methods for an officer 
to conduct a warrantless search when entering an individual’s home. In 2011, the Supreme Court 
decided the police created exigency method for warrantless searches was constitutional 
depending on the specific facts of the case.137 Officers followed an individual, who they believed 
to be a drug dealer, to an apartment complex in Lexington, Kentucky.138 Undercover Officer 
Gibbons saw the deal take place and radioed uniformed officers to move in on the suspect.139 
The officers ran into the breezeway between the apartments, and heard a door shut, as well as the 
strong odor of burnt marijuana.140 Even though Gibbons radioed the warning that the suspect 
went into the apartment on the right, the officers did not hear this and went to the apartment on 
the left based on the odor of burnt marijuana coming from that door.141 Officer Steven Cobb 
knocked on the door and yelled that the police were at the door.142 The officers heard people 
moving inside and believed the people were moving potential evidence inside.143 
 The officers believed that the drug-related evidence was about to be destroyed, which led 
Cobb to kick down the door and enter the front room of the apartment.144 The officers found 
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Hollis King and two others smoking marijuana.145 The officers conducted a protective sweep of 
the apartment and found marijuana and powder cocaine in plain view.146 The officers eventually 
entered the apartment on the right, and found their suspected drug dealer.147 
 The issue before the court was whether the officers impermissibly created the exigent 
circumstances when they entered King’s apartment.148 The Court recognized that “the exigencies 
of the situation make the needs of law enforcement so compelling that a warrantless search is 
objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.”149 The Court reiterated usual exceptions, 
one being to prevent the imminent destruction of evidence.150 However, this Court has adopted 
the police-created exigency doctrine, which states officers cannot merely “rely on the need to 
prevent destruction of evidence when the exigency was created or manufactured by the conduct 
of the police.”151 Rather, courts require more than just a fear of detection by the police to have 
caused the destruction of evidence.152 
 The Court stated that applicable test is whether or not the exigent circumstances justify a 
warrantless search “when the conduct of the police [,] preceding the exigency [,] is reasonable 
…”153 The Supreme Court further emphasized that officers may ask to enter a home if they are 
lawfully on the premises in the first place.154 “If the consent is freely given, it makes no 
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difference that an officer may have approached the person with the hope or expectation of 
obtaining consent.”155 
 The Court concluded that the above test is what the lower courts shall enforce when an 
officer creates the exigent circumstances.156 This test is based on objective factors, because law 
enforcement is best achieved by objectiveness versus subjective factors.157 This allows 
reasonableness to be the determining factor of a search versus solely what that officer would 
have done in that situation. Further, citizens are able to refuse speaking with a police officer 
when the officer does not have a warrant.158 Justice Sutton stated:  
When the police knock on a door, but the occupants choose not to respond or to 
speak, “the investigation will have reached a conspicuously low point,” and the 
occupants “will have the kind of warning that even the most elaborate security 
system cannot provide.159 
Occupants that elect to try and destroy evidence have only “themselves to blame for the 
warrantless exigent circumstances search that may ensue.”160 Therefore, the Supreme Court 
adopted the police-created exigency test which grants officers a tool to conduct searches when 
there is no warrant to conduct the search in the first place, but requires more than just reasonable 
suspicion and a list of facts.161  
B. Police Created Exigencies Grants Officers an Alternative Method of Warrantless Searches 
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The Buie doctrine applies when an officer has a reasonable suspicion that they’re in harm 
from ambush in the home. If an officer fails to satisfy the burden of proof under the Buie 
doctrine, the sensible alternative for an officer would be to use the police-created exigency 
doctrine. Buie is limited to one possible scenario while the King doctrine encompasses different 
scenarios that fall under the category of police-created exigencies. The King doctrine requires 
probable cause, which is a higher standard to meet for officers than Buie. However, the emphasis 
is on the facts of a case and whether or not an officer has an even stronger belief that their well-
being, evidence, or other circumstances are in danger.162 
 The King court noted that consent-based entries create lawful presence in the home, “it 
makes no difference that an officer may have approached the person with the hope or expectation 
of obtaining consent.”163 Thus, warrantless searches are permissible when the circumstances 
make it reasonable to do so as long as the officer did not engage or threat to engage in Fourth 
Amendment violations.164 The test is an objective one, and must be viewed from what a 
reasonably objective officer would have done with the same factual scenario.165  
King finds police-created exigencies permissible as long as they are objectively 
reasonable.166 For example, the officer knocks on the door and is allowed to enter the apartment. 
The officer realizes that there is a ton of noise in the back room. The officer could reasonably 
believe something suspicious is going on based upon the officer’s arrival. Further, now the 
officer may believe he is in serious danger of a significant injury and should conduct a search 
under the King doctrine. Alternatively, if an officer wanted to utilize Buie to justify the search, it 
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would be more difficult because the standard is applied only to a narrow case to justify the 
search. However, King causes an officer need to have a stronger sense of reason compared to 
Buie’s reasonable suspicion standard as explained by the Supreme Court.  
 The goal in Buie was to limit officers who want to conduct a protective sweep of the 
home when they do not have a reasonable belief their safety may be jeopardized by ambush of 
someone in hiding.167 The Buie and King doctrines both focus on reasonableness, however King 
is distinguishable from Buie. King specifically finds that officers have a substantial interest in the 
preservation of evidence and other exigencies like officer safety.168 King implies that when 
police announce their presence or are seen, individuals may act in a way that requires an officer 
to conduct a search without a warrant only after some event or suspicion arises.169 King does not 
face the consent to entry issues that Buie can suffer from, but requires a more rigorous, higher 
standard of analysis to justify the officer’s search. 
 Buie’s standard is severely limited to situations where an officer can articulate that there 
was a belief that his safety is in jeopardy based on articulable facts. The King doctrine is based 
on searches after exigencies occur when the officer is lawfully present in the home by consent. 
The warrantless search is permissible only if an objectively reasonable officer believed a police 
created exigency existed or they are in danger of significant harm.170 King is limited to the 
notable exigencies the courts have recognized, but provides a strong balance of government and 
private interests under the Fourth Amendment because it does not allow officers to have reign in 
the home unless something occurs to warrant such a search, similarly to Buie.171  
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 A side by side of the two doctrines creates an impression that King grants a wider latitude 
to officers to conduct a warrantless search. King allows a search once something occurs which 
makes an officer has probable cause that evidence is in jeopardy based upon their presence, or 
other exigencies recognized by the court. Buie focuses solely on officer safety, which would 
limit an officer in searching the rest of the home. Buie operates more effectively when an arrest 
warrant is present because it grants the officer the reasonable fear of harm present already 
because they are there to make an arrest of a suspected dangerous person. However, if Buie is 
utilized as the Fadul court has, it may be the more preferred option in the non-arrest, consent 
entry context.  
 If Buie is applied as it is now, officers have ample opportunity to abuse the protective 
sweep doctrine. The police-created exigency doctrine allows officers an alternative method to 
satisfy a warrantless search based upon their lawful presence, and offers a wider array of 
scenarios to conduct these searches. Buie is a limited doctrine as explained above, but if the 
doctrine is analyzed similarly to the Fadul court’s method, Buie is an exceptional tool for 
officers. Both doctrines are extremely fact sensitive, but Buie has been utilized by officers in the 
non-arrest consent entry context, creating a divide among the circuit courts. Officer should not be 
left without alternatives to conduct warrantless searches since the private home can be a 
dangerous environment, but Buie can accurately satisfy both the state and private home owner if 
applied as suggested above. Buie is a strong doctrine if properly applied in the non-arrest, 
consent entry context because it effectively weighs the home owners and the government’s 
interest. If Buie does not serve the officer in a given case, the officer is not left without recourse 
to ensure their safety.  
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VI. Conclusion  
The Supreme Court decided in Maryland v. Buie to create the protective sweep doctrine, 
which allows officers to conduct a warrantless search beyond the area the officers have 
entered.172 Buie originally extended only to arrest contexts, but the circuit courts are now split as 
to whether or not Buie should apply to non-arrest, consent.  I have suggested consent to entry 
should be analyzed similarly to how the Jimeno court analyzed the scope of consent given to an 
officer. The court must partake in an analysis of both the consent given by the home owner as 
well as the officer’s articulable facts justifying the warrantless search. 
There is an evident danger that officers may manipulate fact situations as to justify the 
protective sweep. The consent of an individual to an officer’s entry accounts for both parties’ 
interests. Home occupants will usually not announce the limits as to where an officer may go to 
in the home once consent is given. However, there should be a reasonable expectation that 
consent to entry given to an officer in a non-arrest context would lead an officer would 
understand that they are permitted only through the doorway of the home. In the alternative, if an 
officer cannot satisfy the narrow standard set forth under Buie, the Kentucky v. King doctrine 
grants an officer another tool to conduct warrantless searches in the consent entry context. 
Kentucky v. King allows officers to conduct searches when a possible exigency is created due to 
police presence without a warrant. King is a heightened standard with different justifications to 
conduct the search. An officer must not be defenseless when conducting a knock and talk, but 
they should not have free reign as well. An officer that fails to satisfy Buie may have a secondary 
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opportunity to conduct a warrantless search if a police created exigency occurs after they are 
lawfully on the property by consent or by warrant. 
 The Fourth Amendment focuses on reasonable searches. The Buie doctrine should apply 
to non-arrest contexts, specifically consent entries. The consent to entry is not the consent to a 
search. With the emphasis focused on what the occupant’s reasonable expectation as to the 
consent given, other doors become tougher to search for officers. However, officers have the 
ability to ensure their safety, but not at the sacrifice of an individual’s Fourth Amendment rights. 
Officers aren’t left without avenues to search because the police created exigency doctrine grants 
officers an alternative if they are not able to meet the Buie doctrine. King offers a different set of 
circumstances where an officer may conduct a warrantless search (including officer safety). In 
conclusion, the Buie doctrine is still an effective tool in the non-arrest, consent entry context as 
long as the courts endeavor to analyze the consent for entry as well as the articulable facts 
offered to justify the warrantless search. Officers should not be left without an ability to conduct 
these searches, but the consent to entry is not consent to violate a home owner’s Fourth 
Amendment rights.  
